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INTRODUCTION 
In their opening brief, Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, Southern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, and National Parks Conservation Association 
(collectively, "Petitioners") established that the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining ("the 
Division"), in approving the coal mine permit application of Alton Coal Development, LLC 
(UACD"), violated mandatory, non-discretionary duties that the Utah Legislature has enacted 
to ensure effective planning of surface coal mining operations prior to permit issuance. 
Petitioners pointed out that Congress and the Utah Legislature imposed these requirements 
to halt the widespread damage and destruction of resources, including cultural/historic 
treasures and vital water supplies, that coal mines repeatedly caused prior to enactment of 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 
("SMCRA"). See H.R. Rep. No. 218,95th Cong. 1st Sess. 58-59 (1977) (stating that "despite 
claims from some quarters that State reclamation laws have improved so significantly that 
Federal mining standards are no longer needed, the hearing record abounds with evidence 
that this is simply not the case"). SMCRA is clear on the importance of planning to prevent 
damage before it occurs. H.R. Rep. No. 218 at 91 (to ensure that States do not give "short 
shrift" to environmental factors, SMCRA "delineates in detail the type of information 
required in permit applications in section 507 and 508 and the criteria for assessing the merits 
of the application in section 510"); see also S. Rep. No. 128,95th Cong. 1st Sess. 75 (1977).1 
1
 ACD's repeated observations that Petitioners have presented no proof of actual 
harm to cultural/historic or water resources make no sense in light of SMCRA's 
legislative history. Actual harm to such resources cannot be established in hearings on 
challenges to permit approval decisions because the record in such cases closes upon 
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Turning to the specific agency action challenged in this appeal, Petitioners showed 
that despite the duty to withhold approval of permit applications that do not present the full 
range of information and analyses that are essential in evaluating any coal mine proposal, 
U T A H C O D E A N N . § 40-10-1 1(2)(A)(WEST2010);UTAH ADMIN. CoDEr. 645-300-133.100 
(2011), including the duty to take into account the effect of the proposed operation on 
historic properties, UTAH CODE. ANN. § 9-8-404(l)(a) (West 2010); UTAH ADMIN. CODE 
r. 645-300-133.600 (2011), the Division approved ACD's permit application even though it 
failed to analyze the proposed mine's impacts on cultural/historic resources outside the 
permit area. Petitioners also showed that despite the Division's duty to withhold permit 
approval unless and until it finds that the proposed operation has been designed to prevent 
"material damage to the hydrologic balance outside the permit area," UTAH CODE. ANN. 
§ 40-10-1 l(2)(c), UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 645-300-133.400 (2011), the Division refused to 
formulate site-specific criteria that are essential to a rational "material damage" finding. 
Petitioners next showed that despite the duty to withhold permit approval unless and until 
ACD's hydrologic monitoring plans describe how the data they will produce may be used 
to determine the impact of the proposed mine on the hydrologic balance, UTAH ADMIN. CODE 
r. 645-301-731.211 and -731.222 (2011), the Division failed to require ACD to include the 
required description in its permit application. Ultimately, Petitioners established that the 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining ("the Board") unlawfully affirmed the Division's permit 
issuance of a permit before commencement of operations and thus before a mine causes 
any harm. The point of proceedings such as the one below is to prevent harm by ensuring 
adherence to the information, analysis, and planning requirements that the Legislature has 
imposed for protection of the public and the environment. 
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approval decision based on inadequate findings of fact and conclusions of law and a 
complete failure to recognize or respect the mandatory, non-discretionary duties that govern 
this case. 
In response the appellees claim that the Division and the Board enjoy extremely broad 
discretion in implementing Utah's federally approved state regulatory program for 
implementing SMCRA - "the Coal Act and its implementing regulations," UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 40-10-1 et seq. and Utah Admin. R. 645 et seq. - discretion broad enough, in effect, to 
allow the agencies to ignore or effectively re-write the unambiguous statutory and regulatory 
provisions at issue. Moreover, without responding to Petitioners' citation of the duty under 
30 C.F.R. § 733.11 to interpret state programs "in accordance" with SMCRA, the appellees 
claim the prerogative to ignore federal interpretation of statutes and regulations that 
correspond to the Utah laws at issue. Based almost entirely on these claims of broad agency 
discretion and the prerogative to implement Utah's approved state regulatory program 
inconsistently with the legislative history or basis and purpose statements of corresponding 
Federal statutes or regulations, the appellees ask this Court to overlook the agencies' specific 
failures to implement the governing Utah law as the Utah Legislature plainly intended. As 
set forth below, these arguments are without merit. 
ARGUMENT 
L Neither the Division Nor the Board Have Discretion to Ignore or Avoid the 
Mandatory, Non-Discretionary Duties At Issue in This Appeal. 
This appeal concerns the failure of the Division and the Board to withhold the 
approval of ACD's permit application pending (1) full identification and analysis of 
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cultural/historic resources in the "adjacent area" that ACD's proposed operations might 
affect, (2) a rational finding whether ACD's mine is designed to prevent material damage to 
the hydrologic balance outside the proposed permit area, and (3) presentation of hydrologic 
monitoring plans that describe how data may be used to determine the impact of ACD's 
proposed mine on the hydrologic balance. Each of these failures involves an unambiguous, 
mandatory duty that the Utah Legislature or the Board has established to protect this State's 
valuable resources from unnecessary damage by inadequately planned coal mining 
operations, as well as to obtain and maintain primary jurisdiction to regulate surface coal 
mining operations. 
Where, as here, the Legislature enacts a statute that commands the Division and the 
Board to withhold approval of each mining permit application unless and until it contains an 
accurate and complete array of information and analyses, that command limits the discretion 
that regulatory agencies generally enjoy. For example, while the Division and the Board 
certainly retain discretion to determine which protective measures, if any, are appropriate 
with respect to cultural or historic resources identified in a proposed mine's "adjacent area," 
they have no discretion to accept ACD's identification of such resources without also 
requiring an analysis of the need for measures to protect them. Similarly, while the Division 
and the Board retain discretion to determine that a permit applicant has adequately described 
how hydrologic monitoring data may be used, the agencies have no discretion to approve a 
permit application whose monitoring plan does not contain any such description at all. 
For this reason, the appellees' reliance on general rules of agency discretion is 
misplaced. Indeed, none of the case law that the appellees cite suggests that an agency's 
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general discretion as a regulatory authority allows it to ignore mandatory duties that an 
applicable statute or regulation establish precisely for the purpose of guiding the agency's 
regulatory actions. 
To be sure, the Coal Act and its implementing regulations do invest the Division and 
the Board with limited discretion to implement the Utah regulatory program. This appeal, 
however, concerns failure by the Division and the Board to recognize that their discretion 
under the Coal Act is limited by the mandatory duties that the Utah Legislature has 
established in the permit approval process as part of a national effort to ensure more effective 
regulation of coal mining than existed prior to SMCRA's enactment. Those duties 
unambiguously prohibit approval of permit applications that do not contain the full range of 
information and pre-mining analyses that Utah's coal statutes require. For this reason, and 
contrary to the appellees' exaggerated claims, the Division and the Board simply had no 
discretion to approve ACD's permit application despite its failure to contain required 
analyses of identified cultural/historic resources or a rational "material damage" finding, or 
monitoring plans that describe how data may be used. 
II. As a Matter of Both Utah and Federal Law, the Coal Act and Its Implementing 
Regulations Must Be Interpreted in Accordance with SMCRA's Legislative 
History and Federal Regulatory Preambles. 
Without question, the Coal Act and its implementing regulations directly govern the 
evaluation and issuance of permits to conduct surface coal mining operations within the 
State's borders. SMCRA and its implementing federal regulations do not directly govern that 
process. Petitioners have not contended otherwise. 
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Nonetheless, the Utah Legislature has made clear that the primary purpose of the Coal 
Act and its implementing regulations is to "to assure exclusive jurisdiction over nonfederal 
lands and cooperative jurisdiction over federal lands in regard to regulation of coal mining 
and reclamation operations as authorized pursuant to Public Law 95-87 [SMCRA]." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 40-10-2(1). This statement, combined with adoption of language identical 
to, or not materially different from, SMCRA's text throughout the Coal Act, demonstrates 
the Legislature's clear intent that the Board and the Division (collectively, "the agencies") 
- and reviewing courts as well - interpret and apply Utah's coal laws in a manner that 
ensures the State's continuing jurisdiction to regulate surface coal mining operations within 
its borders - an authority commonly known as "primacy." 
Federal law establishes the requirements for maintaining primacy. Simply put, it is 
the obligation of every State with an approved program for implementing SMCRA to 
"implement, administer, enforce and maintain it in accordance with the Act, this chapter and 
the provisions of the approved State program." 30 C.F.R. § 733.11. A State's failure to meet 
this obligation triggers the mandatory duty of the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate and 
implement a Federal regulatory program for the State. 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(3). 
The mandate of 30 C.F.R. § 733.11 requires state regulators and courts to adhere to 
federal interpretation of SMCRA and its implementing regulations in construing or applying 
corresponding provisions of state law. See, e.g., Brown v. Red River Coal Co., 373 S.E.2d 
609, 610 (Va. App. 1988) ("Federal legislative history and interpretation must control 
construction of the state law in these circumstances as a matter of simple federal 
preemption"); Schultz v. Consolidation Coal Co., 475 S.E.2d 467, 469 (W.Va. 1996) ("A 
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state regulation enacted pursuant to [West Virginia's coal law] must be read in a manner 
consistent with federal regulations enacted in accordance with [SMCRA]"). Moreover, a 
State's enactment of laws and regulations for the purpose of obtaining primacy makes the 
obligation to adhere to federal interpretation as much a matter of state legislative intent as 
federal oversight under SMCRA's "structural provisions," which remain "directly operative" 
after state program approval. Brown, 373 S.E.2d at 610-11; Bragg v. West Va. Coal Ass'n, 
248 F.3d 275, 295 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Bragg"). 
The agencies were wrong to ignore or reject federal interpretation of corresponding 
statutory and regulatory provisions in applying the Coal Act and its regulations to the issues 
in this appeal. Similarly, the appellees are wrong to demand that this Court embrace 
interpretations of the Coal Act and its implementing regulations that would shatter the 
minimum floor of regulation that Congress enacted SMCRA to establish. See, e.g., Brief of 
Respondent-[Intervenor-]Appellees ("ACD Br.") at 36-37; Brief of Respondents-Appellees 
("Div./Bd. Br.") at 39. Petitioners urge the Court, as a matter of Utah law, to interpret the 
pertinent provisions of the Coal Act and its implementing regulations "in accordance with" 
corresponding provisions of SMCRA, its implementing federal regulations, and their 
applicable legislative history and regulatory preambles.2 
2
 The appellees misread Bragg to imply an opposite result. Div./Bd. Br. at 13, 39; 
ACD Br. at 34. Bragg held that statutes and regulations making up a federally approved 
state program under SMCRA are state law rather than federal law, and thus that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars citizens from suing state regulators in federal court to compel 
compliance with an approved state program. 248 F.3d at 297-98. However, as Bragg 
itself makes clear, the court neither considered nor decided whether States must construe 
state programs in accordance with federal law. Id. at 295 (noting that SMCRA's 
"structural" provisions "are not at issue in this case"). 
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III. The Board's Interpretation of Utah's Cultural/Historic Resource Review 
Requirements for Coal Mines Ignores Mandatory Pre-approval Duties in Utah 
Law. 
A. The Division Must Document Analysis of an Adjacent Area and it Did 
Not. 
Utah law unambiguously establishes the obligation to analyze the effects of a new 
coal mine on cultural and historic resources outside the permit area. Utah regulations require 
each permit applicant to describe the nature of "cultural and historic resources listed or 
eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places and known archaeological sites 
within the permit and adjacent areas" UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 645-301-411.140 (2011) 
(emphasis added). Utah law imposes an explicit legal obligation on all state agencies 
including the Division here to "take into account the effect . . . . on any historic property" 
before "expending any state funds or approving any undertaking." UTAH CODE. ANN. § 
9-8-404(l)(a) (West 2010). 
In order to ensure that the required analysis takes place before permit approval, Utah's 
coal regulations prohibit the approval of a permit application unless the Division "finds, in 
writing, on the basis of information set forth in the application or from information otherwise 
available that is documented in the approval" that certain requirements are met. UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE r. 645-3 00-13 3.100 (2011). For purposes of cultural/ historic resource review, 
these findings include a determination of eligibility and effect that covers "the permit and 
adjacent areas." UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 645-301-411.140(2011). 
Appellees improperly restrict the Division's obligation to mere identification of sites 
beyond the permit area. Div./Bd. Br. at 19. The agencies argue: 
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This extensive effort to identify cultural resources in the vicinity of the 
proposed mine resulted in maps which fully comply with the Coal Rules by 
depicting all resources or sites falling with the 'permit area' and 'adjacent 
area' as those terms are defined in the regulations. Nothing further is required. 
Id. at 19 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). This misstates the law. Something more 
is required. The plain language of UTAH CODE. ANN. § 9-8-404( 1 )(a) (West 2010) requires 
both identification and analysis of effects before permit approval. Identifying properties is 
the first critical step, but it does not fulfill the Division's unambiguous obligation "to take 
into account the effect" of the proposed coal mine before approving it. UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 9-8-404(l)(a) (West 2010). 
The Division did nothing to address the potential impact of ACD's proposed operation 
on adjacent cultural and historic resources before permitting those operations to proceed. See 
Pet. Br. at 13-14. Nothing in the Division's technical analysis addresses cultural/ historic 
resources in an area adjacent to the permit area. The entire discussion of cultural and historic 
resources is focused on the permit area.3 The Division did not have archeological staff of its 
own, but instead relied upon consultants hired by ACD. R. 5880 at 276-77 (App. Add. Part 
III, 2). These consultants divided their work into phases. Having identified the cultural and 
historic resources in a large area covering both private and federal coal, ACD's consultants 
focused their analysis of effects on the surface area above the private coal that ACD would 
3
 The absence of any discussion of adjacent area in the cultural/historic resource 
section is even more glaring when compared to other sections that do include discussion 
of an adjacent area. See, e.g., H. Ex. D8 at 47 (App. Add. 15) (hydrology section 
discussing "adjacent area"). 
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mine under the state permit. Phase I was limited to the permit area4 and an evaluation of 
effects was completed before the Division's permit approval.3 Evaluation of the effects of 
mining on the area overlying federal coal outside the permit area was to occur at a later date 
if and when federal approval moved forward.6 
The testimony of permit supervisor Daron Haddock at the evidentiary hearing in this 
matter does not cure the absence of documentation in the permit approval of the analysis of 
the mine's impact on cultural/ historic resources beyond the permit area. UTAH ADMIN. 
CODE r. 645-301-411.140 (2011); id. r. 645-300-133 (2011) (prohibiting permit approval 
unless Division "finds, in writing, on the basis of information set forth in the application or 
from information otherwise available that is documented in the approval" that certain 
requirements are met). Despite this requirement, ACD relies on Haddock's testimony 
"explaining] that the Division concluded that any site located entirely beyond the permit 
boundary was unlikely to be adversely impacted." ACD Br. at 20. The Division focused on 
surface disturbance as "the only expected means of adverse impact" and limited its analysis 
4
 The archeological consultants did not include any sites wholly outside the permit 
boundary in their evaluation of effect and preparation of a mitigation plan. MO AC, Data 
Recovery Plan (May 23, 2008) at Figure 1. H. Ex. D14 (App. Add. 20). 
5
 MO AC, Cultural Resource Management Plan Draft 2 (May 23, 2008) at 3, H. Ex. 
D16 (App. Add. 19) ("Phase I consists of the mitigation of seven archeological sites that 
will be impacted by [ADCj's proposed Coal Hollow surface mining plan"). 
6
 Id. ("Research would proceed to Phase II if all of the following events occur: 1) 
the BLM [Bureau of Land Management] completes an EIS for the Alton Coal Tract 
federal coal lease application; 2) the BLM decides to offer the Alton Coal Tract for lease; 
3) the lease is offered for competitive bid; 4) Alton Coal Development, LLC 
successfully acquires the lease."). 
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to the permit area because "surface disturbance must be confined to the permit area." Id. 
(citing R. 5880 at 203:2-12,205:2-206:1). The Board subsequently adopted this rationale. 
See R. 5602 f 79 (App. Add. 1) ("Because surface disturbance is the only anticipated means 
of having an adverse impact on identified sites, and because surface disturbance must be 
confined to the permit area, sites located some distance from the permit area will escape any 
likely effect of 'coal mining and reclamation operations."). Not only did Haddock's 
testimony come too late to cure the absence of appropriate documentation in the Division's 
permit approval decision, the substance of his testimony is fatally inconsistent with the 
fundamental requirement of the Utah rule. After all, the whole point of "addressing" 
resources in an adjacent area is the recognition that the impacts of a proposed coal mine can 
and often do extend beyond the area of surface disturbance on the permit area. Thus, the 
agencies' view that the impact of surface disturbance never extends beyond a mine's permit 
area effectively reads the applicable Utah law out of existence. 
Yet another portion of the agencies' brief illustrates their misunderstanding of the 
obligation to look beyond the permit area. The agencies argue that the "identification of an 
adjacent area is limited by the definition of 'coal mining and reclamation operations." 
Div./Bd. Br. at 24. This argument ignores a fundamental distinction made in the Division's 
own regulations. "Coal mining and reclamation operations" are what must be contained in 
the permit area. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 645-100-200 (2011). The adjacent area includes 
something beyond that: "the area outside the permit area where a resource or resources ... 
are or reasonably could be expected to be adversely impacted by proposed coal mining and 
reclamation operations." Id. (emphasis added). 
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The Coal Act and its implementing regulations required the Division to address the 
potential impact of ACD's proposed mine on cultural and historic resources adjacent to the 
permit area and to document its analysis before approving ACD's permit application. The 
Division failed to do either, rendering approval of the Coal Hollow Mine permit unlawful. 
Accordingly, the Board erred in affirming that action. 
B. The Division Must Obtain the Concurrence of the State Historic 
Preservation Officer in the Analysis of an Adjacent Area and it Did Not. 
Utah's coal regulations require that a permit application for a new coal mine must 
"present evidence of clearances by the SHPO [State Historic Preservation Officer]." UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE r. 645-301-411.142 (2011). The regulations impose a mandatory duty on the 
Division to ensure that such clearances are complete before the permit is approved. UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE r. 645-300-133.100 (2011). As explained above, the clearances required 
include an analysis of the effects of the mine in an adjacent area beyond the permit area. 
Even if the Court finds the Division sufficiently analyzed an adjacent area, the agency never 
presented this rationale to the SHPO. The SHPO, not the Division, has the expertise to 
evaluate whether cultural and historic resources are adequately protected. By including an 
explicit and mandatory requirement for "clearance" by the SHPO, Utah's coal regulations 
rely on both the Division and the SHPO to ensure protection of cultural/historic resources 
while permitting access to coal. Here, the Division unlawfully approved ACD's permit 
application without first obtaining the SHPO's clearance of a critical piece of the 
cultural/historic resource review - an analysis of the adjacent area. 
-12-
Again, the agencies simply get the law wrong. First, they argue that mere 
"coordination" with the SHPO is enough. In listing the applicable legal requirements, they 
include "a description of coordination with the State Historic Preservation Officer" but 
ignore the additional, unambiguous requirement to "present evidence of clearances by the 
SHPO." See, e.g., Div./Bd. Br. at 17; cf. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 645-301-411.142 (2011) 
(emphasis added). Coordination with the SHPO is not enough - approval is required. 
Second, the appellees deny the need for the SHPO to be involved at all in addressing 
an adjacent area. In their brief, the Division and the Board argue that "[t]he SHPO's role 
under its mandate is limited to concurrence with regard to the sites identified and the actions 
proposed, and does not include concurrence in the Division's determination of the extent of 
the 'adjacent area.'" Div./Bd. Br. at 23 n. 8. To the contrary, clearances the Division 
received from the SHPO related to the permit area do not excuse failure to obtain clearance 
related to the proposed mine's adjacent area. Evaluation of a proposed mine's effects on the 
area adjacent to the permit area is a critical part of ensuring that a new mine does not 
unwittingly damage Utah's irreplaceable cultural/historic resources. 
In an exchange of correspondence with the Division, the SHPO noted that "I've 
brought our buildings specialists, primarily Chris Hansen, in the loop. He can help you with 
analysis of effects to Panguitch." H. Ex. P10. The Division's own final technical analysis 
recognized the relevance of the Panguitch National Historic District to its analysis of the 
proposed Coal Hollow Mine and explicitly recognized the need to address u[i]ndirect effects, 
such as transportation." H. Ex. D8 (App. Add. 15) at 19. Additionally, the Division noted 
the need to include "other cultural resources such as the National Register of Historic Places 
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Historic District in Panguitch" as part of the affected environment. Id. Yet, the Division and 
the Board approved the permit without completing the required analysis.7 
Failure to obtain the SHPO's clearance regarding the analysis of an adjacent area is 
not a mere paper error. Utah law explicitly requires such clearance before permit approval 
to ensure analysis is completed in time to prevent damage before it occurs. Here, the 
Division did no analysis whatsoever of the potential impact of numerous daily coal trucks 
rumbling through the Panguitch National Historic District. The Division did nothing to 
determine the baseline traffic, the amount of existing commercial traffic or the potential new 
truck traffic from the mine. The Division did not appreciate that it needed to look at the 
mine's effects beyond the permit area until Petitioners raised the issue in challenging 
approval of ACD's permit. As a result of the Division's failure to complete this analysis, 
irreparable damage may occur even though Utah law is structured to prevent it. This Court 
must act to preserve the delicate balance Utah law provides for the protection of both the 
State's important cultural/historic resources and the mining of coal. 
7
 ACD asserts that "[t]he Board found that every site lying beyond the permit 
boundaries and likely to be affected by mining was evaluated by the Division and cleared 
by the SHPO." ACD Br. at 20. Although the Board did make such a finding, nothing in 
the record indicates that the Division discussed any sites wholly outside the permit area. 
The documents speak for themselves. Nothing in what the Division sent the SHPO 
seeking concurrence addressed the effects of the mine in an adjacent area. In fact, when 
the Division explicitly asked the SHPO for concurrence that no adverse effects would 
occur in an adjacent area, H. Ex. P5 (App. Add. 21), the SHPO did not provide it, H. Ex. 
D22 (App. Add. 22). 
-14-
IV. The Appellees Have Failed to Demonstrate That the Board's Findings and 
Conclusions on the CHIA Issue Are Adequate or That the Board Correctly 
Affirmed the Division's Material Damage Finding. 
In their opening brief, Petitioners argued that the Division erred as a matter of law in 
performing its cumulative hydrologic impact assessment ("CHIA") for ACD's mine without 
formulating or applying site-specific material damage criteria as part of that process. 
Petitioners cited OSM's longstanding recognition of this requirement, and they explained that 
by neglecting to develop a site-specific definition of "material damage to the hydrologic 
balance" based on a reasoned analysis of the ability of affected water resources to tolerate 
changes that might result from ACD's mining operations, the Division failed to establish a 
rational basis for determining whether ACD's mine is designed to prevent material damage. 
Petitioners pointed out the Division's fundamental legal error in postponing 
development of a site-specific definition of material damage until after mining begins, 
despite the statutory requirement to make a material damage finding prior to permit approval, 
well before damage can occur. Petitioners showed that the Board affirmed the Division's 
CHIA based on findings and conclusions which also fail to define "material damage to the 
hydrologic balance" and, for that reason and others, fall far short of standards that this Court 
and the Utah Court of Appeals have established. 
In response the agencies do not even attempt to defend the adequacy of the Board's 
findings or conclusions on the CHIA issue. Instead of demonstrating a rational basis for the 
CHIA's pro forma material damage finding, the agencies attempt to obscure the issue before 
the Court by repeatedly insisting that Petitioners' arguments are actually aimed at compelling 
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the formulation of material damage criteria to serve as a basis for enforcement action after 
mining is underway. Div./Bd. Br. at 26, 29, 30-31, 34, 36. 
Petitioners made no such argument in their opening brief. The arguments that 
Petitioners actually did make were carefully focused on the requirement to establish material 
damage criteria as design standards and not as an enforcement tool. Accordingly, much of 
what the Division and the Board have to say in their response brief simply has no relevance 
to the CHI A issue in this appeal.8 
The fact that a CHIA is a design tool only underscores the need to establish a site-
specific definition of "material damage" as part of the process. It is not possible to rationally 
determine whether a proposed mine is designed to prevent "material damage" to the 
hydrologic balance without first defining the conditions that would constitute "material 
damage" to the water resources that the agency must protect. By the same token, effective 
judicial review of the Division's finding that a proposed mine is designed to prevent material 
hydrologic damage requires the agency to define the "material damage" standards it applied 
in reaching its conclusion concerning the proposed mine's hydrologic design. See Mountain 
States Legal Found, v. Utah Pub. Serv. Cornm'n., 636 P.2d 1047, 1051-52 (Utah 1981). 
Here, in postponing the definition of site-specific material damage criteria until after the 
commencement of mining operations, the Division revealed that its statutorily required 
8
 To be clear on the point, Petitioners agree that the CHIA process, and the 
formulation of material damage criteria, must focus solely on the adequacy of a proposed 
mine's hydrologic design. Debate over whether, how, or to what extent material damage 
criteria may be used in an enforcement context after commencement of mining operations 
is thus irrelevant in evaluating the adequacy of a CHIA. 
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"material damage" finding was, in fact, a pro forma statement unsupported by rational 
analysis of the ability of potentially affected water resources to sustain changes that ACD's 
mining operations might cause. 
The agencies' assertion that the "threshold indicators" identified in the Division's 
CHIA meet the description of "material damage criteria" that, according to OSM's CHIA 
Guidance Document, a regulatory authority "must have and must include in the assessment 
report," see Div./Bd. Br. at 29, H. Ex. D-26 at IV-22, does not square with the description of 
"material damage criteria" that OSM provides in the same document. The CHIA Guidance 
Document states that "material damage criteria" for any particular CHIA are "a set of site-
specific values for selected parameters used to measure the material damage." Id. The 
document goes on to say that "[t]he material damage criteria, of course, cannot require less 
than the existing laws, standards or regulations," id., thus indicating that, at a minimum, a 
regulatory authority must include as material damage criteria each water quantity or quality 
standard by which the law protects water resources that a proposed mine may impair. 
In marked contrast, the "threshold indicators" identified in the Division's CHIA do 
not themselves "measure" or define material damage. Instead, they merely serve as flags 
meant only to prompt the development of material damage criteria after mining is already 
underway. H. Ex. D-23 at 39-41 (making "evaluation for material damage" contingent on 
excursions from indicator parameter levels after commencement of mining); see also R. 5883 
at 559-60, 603-04, 655-56.9 
9
 By failing to adopt any material damage criteria for ACD's mine, the Board and 
Division have forestalled debate on what the applicable criteria should be. As framed by 
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Again, the fundamental error in the Division's performance of the CHIA for ACD's 
mine is the agency's postponement of a site-specific definition of "material damage" until 
after mining begins. The agencies attempt to excuse this failure on the ground that 
conditions observed after the commencement of mining may require refinement of any site-
specific "material damage" definition developed during the CHIA process. Div./Bd. Br. at 
29-30. This is nonsense. The possibility that the Division may need to refine its site-specific 
definition of "material damage" after the start of mining in no way diminishes the need to set 
"material damage" criteria during the CHIA process in order to make and support a rational 
"material damage" finding prior to issuance of a mining permit, as the statutes, regulations, 
and OSM guidance expressly require. 
The agencies erroneously assert that OSM and other courts have rejected Petitioners' 
arguments on the CHIA issue in this case. Div./Bd. Br. at 31-33. As Petitioners stated in 
their opening brief, OSM has repeatedly stated that regulatory authorities must develop some 
sort of material damage criteria in the process of making and supporting the statutorily 
required "material damage" finding concerning a proposed mine's hydrologic design. Pet. 
Br. at 20-22 & n.4. 
The debate elsewhere in recent rulemaking and litigation on this point does not 
question whether the development of some material damage criteria is required in the CHIA 
process. Indeed, so far as Petitioners are aware, the Utah agencies are alone in contesting 
that proposition. 
the agencies' decisions, the issue here is whether development of any material damage 
criteria is a necessary part of the CHIA process. 
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Instead, the debate elsewhere is whether the material damage criteria that a regulatory 
authority does select must, at a minimum, include all water quantity and quality standards 
that the Clean Water Act and other laws have established. See 30 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3). By 
refusing to establish any material damage criteria in performing or affirming the CHIA for 
ACD's proposed mine, the Division and the Board have precluded Petitioners from raising 
that issue in this appeal. Accordingly, the appellees' claim that OSM's approval of West 
Virginia's 2008 program amendments or the district court's opinion affirming that decision 
somehow reject Petitioners' arguments in this appeal is plainly incorrect.10 
To the contrary, OSM's rulemaking on the amendments to the CHIA provisions of 
West Virginia's state program strongly supports Petitioners' arguments in this appeal. 
See Pet. Br. at 21. OSM made clear that its approval of West Virginia's new material 
damage criteria was based on "the understanding that the State will determine on a case-by-
case basis meaningful objective material damage criteria in order to make the finding 
regarding material damage required by 30 CFR 773.15(e)." 73 Fed. Reg. 78,977 (Dec. 24, 
2008). The agencies did not follow that mandate here. Indeed, despite Petitioners' citation 
to this statement, the agencies fail even to acknowledge the principle, much less explain why 
it does not demand reversal of their CHIA finding for ACD's mine. 
The agencies' restatement of the CHIA issue as whether "the Division's CHIA set 
adequate thresholds or criteria to indicate to the Division whether the hydrologic balance in 
the area surrounding the mine is being negatively affected and necessitates further 
10
 The district court's judgment is currently before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Oral argument is scheduled for December 6, 2011. 
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investigation," Div./Bd. Br. at 34, only highlights the agencies' misunderstanding of their 
mission. The point of performing a CHIA is not to establish criteria that trigger "further 
investigation" after mining begins and after the surrounding area becomes "negatively 
affected." The CHIA process is meant to determine, based on material damage criteria 
formulated prior to the onset of mining, whether a proposed mine has been designed to 
prevent material damage to the hydrologic balance in the first place. An agency simply 
cannot accomplish that mission by deferring the definition of "material damage" until after 
mining begins. 
ACD defends the CHIA by arguing that the "threshold indicators" that the Division 
identified are actually "flexible material damage criteria" which the agency used to make a 
rational decision on the hydrologic design of ACD's mine. ACD Br. at 31-32 & n. 14, 37. 
This position, however, is fatally inconsistent with the CHIA's own description of the role 
of the "threshold indicators" and with the Division's clear postponement of material damage 
analysis until after commencement of mining. Moreover, ACD fails to explain how the 
Division might have used "flexible" material damage criteria to make a firm decision on the 
hydrologic design of the Coal Hollow Mine. Instead, ACD points out that it designed the 
mine to have "zero discharge" of runoff within the mine site and seems to contend that this 
feature of its proposal negates the need to establish material damage criteria. ACD Br. at 33. 
The problem with ACD's argument is two-fold. First, the Division recognized that 
ACD's zero discharge design was not sufficient reason to abandon the CHIA process and 
declare, on that basis alone, that ACD's mine is designed to prevent material damage outside 
the permit area. Instead of relying on ACD's zero-discharge plan, the Division obviously 
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perceived the need to make a material damage determination based on other factors, and it 
proceeded to do so. H. Ex. 23 at 44 (noting that, despite the zero discharge plan, protective 
measures and analyses remain appropriate). Second, ACD's zero-discharge design does not 
speak at all to the likely effect of its operations on ground water resources in the area or to 
the effect on surface waters of post-mining ground water discharges outside the permit area. 
As ACD acknowledges, ground water discharges on and to the east of its permit area have 
long fed a flow of water "which usually reaches Kanab Creek," the principal surface water 
resource in the area. ACD Br. at 27. Accordingly, even if the Division had relied on ACD's 
"zero-discharge" design as a peremptory answer to potential surface water concerns - which 
the agency clearly did not - that feature of ACD's permit application would not have 
lessened the need to develop material damage criteria for ground water or to make a rational 
"material damage" finding with respect to that resource. 
Confronted with the failure of the Division and the Board to interpret Utah's CHIA 
law in accordance with federal interpretation and guidelines, ACD argues that Utah's CHIA 
requirement is unambiguous and therefore that any resort to the federal interpretive materials 
that Petitioners cite is unnecessary. ACD Br. at 35. In Petitioners' view, for the reasons 
stated in their opening brief and reiterated above, the Utah requirement to withhold approval 
of each mining permit application unless and until the Division determines that it has been 
designed to prevent material damage unambiguously requires the Division to define for each 
proposed mine what constitutes "material damage to the hydrologic balance." Because ACD 
interprets the same language differently, Petitioners cite OSM's regulatory preambles and 
CHIA Guidance Document, in an abundance of caution, to show that the words of Utah's 
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statute and regulations most certainly require development of material damage criteria as a 
necessary step in making and supporting a rational determination whether a mine is designed 
to prevent material damage. Because the agencies failed to satisfy this requirement, their 
approval of ACD's permit application was unlawful. 
V. The Appellees Have Failed to Show that ACD's Monitoring Plan Describes How 
Data May Be Used to Determine the Hydrologic Impact of ACD's Mine. 
Petitioners' opening brief established that neither the section of the Coal Hollow 
permit application that ACD identified as its "hydrologic monitoring plan," VII at 7-57, nor 
ACD's application and related documents, taken as a whole, describes how the data that 
ACD will collect during its operations may be used to determine the impact of ACD's mine 
on the hydrologic balance. Pet. Br. at 36-49. In response, appellees quarrel with Petitioners' 
interpretation of the data description requirement in accordance with OSM's preamble to the 
rule as initially proposed. Div./Bd. Br. at 39; ACD Br. at 41-42 & n.18.11 However, they 
offer no other plausible interpretation, nor do they explain why, at least so far as Petitioners 
can determine, Utah did not expressly state an intention to interpret its rule differently from 
the federal counterpart when it sought OSM's approval. Cf. 30 C.F.R. § 731.14(c)(2) 
11
 The agencies incorrectly assert that OSM's proposed data description rule "was 
never adopted into the final federal rule for water monitoring plans." Div./Bd. Br. at 39. 
OSM certainly did finalize its proposed hydrology rules, albeit without text that requires 
"a narrative that describes how the data may be used to determine the impact, if any, of 
the operation upon the hydrologic balance." Cf. ACD Br. at 41 n.18. However, because 
OSM's statement of basis and purpose for the final rule neither mentions the changed text 
of the data description requirement nor suggests any alteration of the policy and purpose 
stated in the proposed rule's preamble, that preamble remains a reliable statement of 
OSM's intent, especially where, as here, it is the only statement of agency intent. As the 
only statement of OSM's intent, it necessarily governs Utah's implementation of its 
identical rule. 
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(requiring submission to OSM of "a section-by-section comparison of the State's law and 
regulations and amendments which are in the process of enactment with the Act [SMCRA] 
and this chapter [30 C.F.R. Chapter VII], explaining any differences and their legal effect"). 
Appellees insist nonetheless that the Board's discretion to apply the rule allows it to 
rely on statements spread throughout the entire permit application, even though ACD 
provided no indication that anything outside the "Water Monitoring" section was meant to 
be a part of the required plan or to satisfy the data description requirement. See Div./Bd. Br. 
at 41-46; ACD Br. at 40-45. Appellees fault Petitioners for presenting no witness on this 
issue at hearing, but ignore entirely the fact that the appellees' own experts admitted that the 
required data description is not set out expressly in ACD's permit application - thus making 
it additional testimony on the issue unnecessary. See R. 5882 at 463-64, 474-75, 504, 512, 
514. Finally, appellees ignore the issue actually on appeal concerning hydrologic monitoring 
of Lower Robinson Creek, preferring to re-argue a related claim which Petitioners asserted 
below but elected not to appeal. Scramble as they may, however, the appellees fail 
throughout their arguments to identify anything in ACD's application that satisfies the 
mandate to "describe how these data may be used to determine the impacts of the operation 
upon the hydrologic balance." UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 645-3 01-731.211 and 731.222 (2011). 
At best, appellees point only to identifications - located outside the application's 
monitoring plan section - of various data analysis tools that ACD used to characterize the 
pre-mining hydrologic balance. But they do not point to anything in these references that 
establishes whether, or describes how, ACD proposes to use these tools to determine the 
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impacts of its mining operations on the hydrologic balance. According to appellees, this is 
to be inferred from mere mention of these tools, based on "common sense." 
The short answer to that argument is that the Secretary of the Interior expressly 
required a description of how data may be used to avoid the likelihood that "common sense" 
would lead different individuals to infer different things about the appropriate use of 
hydrologic monitoring tools. By its very nature, an express requirement to describe how 
something may be done cannot be satisfied by reliance on "common sense" or inferences that 
a reader supposedly will draw from sources to which the author does not even refer. At a 
minimum, such a description must expressly state what may be done to accomplish the end 
result. In accepting inference in lieu of an express statement, the Board clearly abused 
whatever discretion the regulation may afford it in evaluating the content of data descriptions 
that more observant permit applicants may include in other applications. 
Finally, the agencies' reliance on the language of the regulations themselves to 
somehow meet the data description requirement is patent nonsense. Cf. Div./Bd. Br. at 44-
45. If a body of regulations imposes a requirement to describe something in a permit 
application, the plain intent is to require each permit applicant to present a statement that 
goes beyond whatever the regulations themselves may say on the subject. If it were 
permissible to read the regulations at issue here to supply the required data description 
themselves, there plainly would be no need for the data description requirement at all. 
Meeting the data description mandate certainly requires something well beyond bare 
reference to the language of the regulations themselves. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and in their opening brief, Petitioners urge the Court to 
reverse the Board's decision and grant the additional relief requested in Petitioners' opening 
brief. 
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